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I.

INTRODUCTION

A vendor's lien is superior to all other liens except for those of good faith encumbrancers
for value. LC. § 45-803. Idaho's vendor's lien statute is fairly simple. A vendor's lien exists
when the following conditions are met: (1) the unsecured (2) seller of real property (3) has not
been paid the full purchase price for the property. LC. § 45-801. At trial it was undisputed that
NIR was unsecured in the sale of Trestle Creek to POBD. 1 The district court erred when it
concluded that Idaho's vendor's lien statute requires the seller of the real property to also be the
title owner of the property and denied NIR a vendor's lien on that basis. The district court also
erred when it concluded that NIR was paid the full purchase price for Trestle Creek, ignoring
NIR's entitlement to participation payments and/or payments for bulk lot sales as set forth in the
Third Amended and Restated Purchase and Sale Agreement.
The district court also erred when it found that Pacific Capital 2 was a good faith
encumbrancer for value because Pacific Capital had actual, if not constructive, knowledge that
NIR was still owed money for the sale of Trestle Creek at the time Union Bank made its initial
loan and subsequently encumbered Trestle Creek.
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

NIR WAS THE SELLER OF TRESTLE CREEK

NIR has a valid and enforceable vendor's lien on Trestle Creek because it was the seller
of the Trestle Creek property. Idaho Code § 45-801 creates a lien for the seller of property for
which total payment has not been received: "One who sells real property has a vendor's lien
thereon, independent of possession, for so much of the price as remains unpaid and unsecured."

1 References in this brief to Pend Oreille Bonner Developments (POBD) include Pend Oreille Bonner Investments
(POBI or PBI), as the original purchaser of Trestle Creek.
2 References in this brief to Pacific Capital as the original lender and encumbrancer of Trestle Creek includes
MUFG Union Bank as the successor real party in interest and vice versa.
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Referring to the current statute's predecessor with the exact same language, the Idaho Supreme
Court said that Idaho's vendor's lien statute "simply provides that one who sells real property
has a vendor's lien." Farnsworth v. Pepper, 27 Idaho 154, 148 P. 48, 50 (1915). The plain
language of the statute does not require the seller to be the record owner of the property, have a
specific type of interest in the property, be the party to actually transfer the property, or that the
buyer be in default on payment. The statute simply requires that the claimant of a vendor's lien
be the seller of the property and be owed a portion of the purchase price.
Union Bank claims in its response "at trial, there was no evidence of NIR' s interest in the
Trestle Creek Property

only that the property was held by Pend Oreille Limited, not NIR." p.

11. This argument is contrary to the district court's finding, which was not cross appealed by
Union Bank. The district court specifically found that NIR was the seller of Trestle Creek: "The
seller was North Idaho Resorts, LLC (NIR)." R Vol. VIII, p. 1719. The district court's finding
was supported by the testimony of Richard Villelli (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 309, L. 17-25; p. 285 L. 12 -p.
286, L. 2; Tr. Vol. 3, p. 360 L. 11

p. 361, L. 1); the Pend Oreille Limited deed executed by

Richard Villelli (Trial Exhibit 11) and the Third Amended and Restated Real Property Purchase
and Sale Agreement (Trial Exhibit 3).
Despite the district court's finding that NIR was the seller of Trestle Creek, it misapplied
the statute when it found that NIR was not entitled to a vendor's lien on Trestle Creek because
NIR was never the record owner of Trestle Creek:
The transfer of Trestle Creek to POBD was not executed by 'NIR', but one of the
limited partners that formed NIR. Trestle Creek was never deeded to NIR. As
such NIR did not obtain a vendor's lien upon Trestle Creek.
R Vol. VIII, p. 1721.

2

Much like the district court, Union Bank attempts to rewrite Idaho's vendor's lien statute,
but instead of focusing on title ownership as a requirement, Union Bank redefines "one who
sells" or "seller" to require the seller to also be the holder of title to the property to obtain a
vendor's lien: "In effect, the trial court held that ' [o]ne who sells real property' under Section 45801 is one who transfers real property." Respondent's Brief at 10-11 (emphasis
added).
.

-

Union Bank's response refuses to accept the district court's finding that NIR was the
seller of Trestle Creek. Union Bank attempts to redefine the term seller in an effort to disqualify
NIR from being a seller under LC. § 45-801.
Union Bank asks this Court on appeal to require that a seller under LC. § 45-801 meet
two elements. The first is the seller be the transferor of the property. The second is the seller
have an interest in the property, of which it has the burden of proof to establish. Neither of these
"requirements" are found within LC. § 45-801. The first requirement, transfer of the property, is
unsupported by the very case law cited by Union Bank. The second requirement, an interest in
the property, while not a statutory requirement, was established at trial by NIR by clear and
convincing evidence.
Union Bank cites to Farnsworth v. Pepper, 27 Idaho 154, 148 P. 48, 50 (1915) supra, in
support of its position that a seller must execute the deed that transfers title to claim a vendor's
lien.

In Farnsworth the Court concluded the equitable owner of real property (Joseph

Farnsworth) who sold it to another (Pepper) had a valid vendor's lien on the property, despite
never being the record owner of the property and not being directly involved in its transfer. The
facts of that case are simple. On August 10, 1910, Joseph Farnsworth (Joseph) entered into a
contract to sell 40 acres of real property to LW. Pepper (Pepper). The 40 acres was titled in the
name of Joseph's brother Benjamin Farnsworth (Benjamin). There was an arrangement between
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Joseph and Benjamin that Joseph owned these 40 acres in exchange for "certain advances that he
had made to his brother." Id. Later on November 4, 1910, Benjamin entered into a contract to
sell a different 40 acre parcel to Pepper. On November 15, 1910, Benjamin conveyed both 40
acre parcels to Pepper.

Some time thereafter, Joseph brought an action against Pepper to

foreclose on a vendor's lien for the unpaid portion of the purchase price of the 40 acres he sold.
Pepper argued that Joseph did not have an enforceable vendor's lien for two reasons: first,
because Joseph never held the title to the land, and second, because Joseph did not convey or
transfer the land. Both the trial court and the Idaho Supreme Court disagreed.
The Idaho Supreme Court recognized that Joseph "was the equitable owner of said land
and sold it to [Pepper]." Id. The Court further recognized that "the conveyance of said land by
Benjamin Farnsworth to [Pepper] as effectually conveyed the title of said land to [Pepper] as if
Benjamin Farnsworth had first conveyed it to [Joseph] and [Joseph] had then conveyed it to
[Pepper]." Id. This case confirmed the seller of property claiming a vendor's lien does not have
to be the titled owner of the property and does not have to transfer or convey the property to the
buyer. The seller need only be the equitable owner of the property to claim a vendor's lien.
Union Bank contends this case is distinguished from the present case because the
evidence showed that the parties arranged to have Benjamin convey the entire 80 acres to avoid a
conveyance between the brothers, and a subsequent conveyance to the seller. Union Bank also
contends that the case is distinguished from the present case because the buyer acknowledged the
arrangement in \vriting. These are distinctions without significance in this case. It is also an
attempt to attack the trial court's finding that NIR was the seller of the Trestle Creek property,
which was not cross appealed.
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The trial court found that NIR was the seller. The undisputed evidence before the trial
court by which it arrived at that finding included that the property was contributed by Pend
Oreille Limited to NIR in 1998 or 1999 for an ownership interest in NIR. Pend Oreille Limited
was a member of NIR. The Third Amended and Restated Real Property Purchase and Sale
Agreement included Trestle Creek and was executed by the seller and the buyer as such.
Therefore, the present case fits squarely within the holding of Farnsworth v. Pepper, supra.
The Farnsworth case is instructive to the case at hand and illustrates the trial court's
error. NIR does not need to be the title owner of Trestle Creek to qualify for a vendor's lien.
The district court erred when it interpreted LC. § 45-801 to require NIR to transfer legal title to
obtain a vendor's lien. R Vol. VIII, p. 1721. Also, NIR did not have to actually convey or
transfer Trestle Creek to qualify for a vendor's lien. Like Joseph Farnsworth, all NIR needed to
establish to qualify as a seller of Trestle Creek was an equitable ownership of Trestle Creek.
The record is clear and the facts are undisputed that NIR was the equitable owner of
Trestle Creek.

Pend Oreille Limited contributed the Trestle Creek property to NIR as its

contribution to become a member ofNIR. Tr Vol. 2, p. 285, L. 22
p. 310, L. 4; Vol. 3, p. 360, L. 11

p. 286, L. 7; p. 309, L. 17 -

p. 361, L. 1. Much like the Farnsworth brothers, Pend

Oreille Limited and NIR had an agreement wherein title to Trestle Creek was held in Pend
Oreille Limited's name, but the land was contributed to NIR as Pend Oreille Limited's
contribution to NIR in exchange for membership in the entity. The facts couldn't be more
analogous to the Farnsworth case and the outcome should be the same: the district court should
have recognized NIR's vendor's lien based upon its equitable interest in the property.
Union Bank asks this Court to apply the holding of Russ Ballard & Family Achievement
Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572, 548, P.2d 72, (1976) and conclude that NIR

5

was not the seller of Trestle Creek because it did not meet its burden of proof to establish its
ownership of Trestle Creek. Respondent's Brief at 12-13. Once again, Union Bank is attempting
to attack the finding of the trial court that NIR was the seller even though it did not cross appeal.
The Russ Ballard case held "the law presumes that the holder of title to property is the
owner thereof... One who would claim the ownership of property of which the legal title
stands ... must establish such claim by evidence that is clear, satisfactory and convincing." 97
Idaho at 579, 548 P.2d at 79 (internal quotations and citations omitted). As stated previously,
there was undisputed clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence at trial court by which the trial
court found NIR was the seller of Trestle Creek.
At trial Richard Villelli testified that Pend Oreille Limited made contributions to NIR in
exchange for an ownership interest in that entity:
Q. The entity who deeded the property to Pend Oreille Bonner
Development Holdings, Incorporated, is what?
A. It is Pend Oreille, Limited.
Q. And you indicated that Pend Oreille, Limited, joined forces, if you
would, with a few other entities and limited partners in North Idaho Resorts; is
that correct?
A. Pend Oreille, Limited contributed its partnership to North Idaho
Resorts, LLC, in return for a percentage of ownership.
Tr Vol. 2, p. 309, L. 17

p. 310, L. 4. Richard Villelli also testified that Pend Oreille Limited

contributed Trestle Creek to NIR as its contribution to become a member ofNIR:
Q. Yesterday Mr. Miller was asking you about Pend Oreille, Limited, and
its partnership with North Idaho Resorts, LLC. Is there a written agreement
between Pend Oreille, Limited, and North Idaho Resorts related to the transfer of
Trestle Creek to North Idaho Resorts?
A. The written agreement would be the limited the North Idaho Resorts,
Limited Liability Document, and in there it shows the contributions of the three
entities, and it would delineate that Pend Oreille, Limited, was contributing the
land it held, known as Trestle Creek, to the partnership.
Q. And when was the limited liability operating agreement executed?
A. You know, I believe that was in '98. It may have been in '99.
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Tr Vol. 3, p. 360, L. 11

p. 361, L. 1.

The district court specifically found that Richard Villelli was a credible witness. R Vol.
VIII, p. 1721. There was no contradictory testimony or evidence presented at trial regarding
NIR's interest in Trestle Creek.
The Purchase and Sale Agreement itself makes it clear that NIR was the seller of Trestle
Creek:
This Third Amended and Restated Real Property Purchase and Sale
Agreement ("this Agreement") .. .is entered into and made effective as of
March 9, 2006 (the "Agreement Date") by and between [POBD] or such
affiliate of [POBD] as [POBD] shall designate (in either case "Buyer")
and NORTH IDAHO RESORTS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company
("Seller").
Trial Exhibit EEE, 1 (emphasis added).

Later in the Purchase and Sale Agreement NIR

warranted that "Seller or Seller's partners own marketable fee simple title to the entirety of the
property" and "Seller has the legal power, right and authority" to enter into that agreement. Id. at
§ 1 l(a).
There was no evidence presented at trial that NIR was not the seller of Trestle Creek,
only that the transfer deed effectuating the agreement was from Pend Oreille Limited to POBD.
Idaho Code § 45-801 does not require record ownership. Moreover, as discussed above, there
was undisputed evidence presented at trial of NIR's equitable ownership in Trestle Creek.
Further, the transfer deed from Pend Oreille Limited, signed by Richard Villelli, was executed as
part of performance of the purchase and sale agreement.
Despite the undisputed evidence at trial, the district court never made any finding with
regard to NIR's equitable ownership of Trestle Creek. It found that NIR was the seller. It then
found that that NIR was never deeded Trestle Creek and concluded NIR never obtained a
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vendor's lien. R Vol. VIII, p. 1721. That is because the district court erroneously interpreted I.C.
§ 45-801 to require that the seller also be the record owner of the property.

In conclusion, there was evidence at trial that NIR was the seller of Trestle Creek, and the
trial court made that finding. To constitute the seller, NIR had to have an interest in the real
property. There was clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence presented at trial that NIR was
the equitable owner of Trestle Creek based upon the contribution of the property by Pend Oreille
limited to NIR to obtain a membership interest in NIR. Therefore, NIR qualified as the seller of
Trestle Creek under LC. § 45-801. Accordingly, the district court erred when it interpreted LC. §
45-801 to require record ownership of the subject property to obtain a vendor's lien. As the
seller with equitable title in Trestle Creek, NIR had a valid vendor's lien on the Trestle Creek
property.
B.

A PORTION OF THE PURCHASE PRICE FOR THE SALE OF TRESTLE
CREEK REMAINS UNPAID

NIR sold the Trestle Creek property to POBD pursuant to the Third Amended and
Restated Real Property Purchase and Sale Agreement ("Purchase and Sale Agreement"), Trial
Exhibit 3. The Purchase and Sale Agreement defines the "purchase price" for Trestle Creek in
Clause 2, beginning on page 3. Some of the purchase price was based upon set figures, some
was based upon a formula tied to sales (which was not a profit sharing formula), and an
alternative payment clause was based upon any bulk sales of lots. Both Charles Reeves and
Richard Villelli testified at trial that the formula payments and bulk sale contingency were part
of the purchase price of Trestle Creek. Tr Vol. 2, p. 120, L. 10-15; p. 184, L. 21 -p. 185, L. 5; p.
18, L. 6-14; p. 287, L. 17 -p. 289, L. 22. It was undisputed at trial that this formula was not a
profit sharing arrangement.

It was undisputed that such a formula as a sales term is not

uncommon in the sale of land development properties.
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Tr Vol. 2, p. 288, L. 1-3.

It was

undisputed at trial that NIR had not yet received any participation payments or bulk sale
payments. Tr Vol. 2, p. 184, L. 21-24; p. 185, L. 1-5; p. 120, L. 10-12; p. 120, L. 16-20. It was
also undisputed that the Idaho Club development was on hold at the time of trial. Tr Vol. 2, p.
120, L. 23-p. 121, L. 10.
The district court recognized the formula providing future payments was a term of the
purchase price in the Purchase and Sale Agreement. R Vol. VIII, p. 1719.

Despite the

undisputed evidence that NIR had not been paid the participation payments it was owed under
the Purchase and Sale Agreement, and that the development was ongoing at the time of trial, the
district court concluded that "NIR has received all of the monies guaranteed to it based upon the
acquisition of Trestle Creek by POBD." R Vol. VIII, p. 1721. The district court reached this
erroneous conclusion because of its difficulty in valuing contingent future payments owed to
NIR:
NIR has received all of the benefit of its deal with POBD except a share of
future bulk sales or its share of revenues in excess of $80,000,000.00 ... The
possibility of future bulk sales or revenues is unknown and open to speculation.
R Vol. VIII, p. 1721 (emphasis added). However, valuation of NIR' s vendor's lien was not an
issue before the district court and is not an issue before this Court. The only determination the
district court needed to make was whether NIR had a vendor's lien, not its value.
NIR' s entitlement to future payments is based on a condition precedent, specifically that
the project exceed $80 million in gross sales revenue or that a bulk lot sale occur.

The

possibility that this condition precedent might fail does not invalidate the Purchase and Sale
Agreement or NIR's entitlement to the purchase price as set forth in that agreement. Conditions
precedent are valid and enforceable contract terms. World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111
Idaho 880, 887-888, 728 P.2d 769, 776-777 (Ct.App. 1986); Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864
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P.2d 132 (1993); Ernst v. Hemenway & Moser, Co., Inc., 120 Idaho 941, 946, 821 P.2d 996,
1001 (Ct.App. 1991). NIR and POBD agreed to the terms of the purchase price for Trestle Creek
and their freedom to contract should not be hindered because the district court had difficulty
valuing entitlements to future payment. See Jesse v. Lindsley, 149 Idaho 70, 75, 233 P.3d 1, 6
(2008) (Freedom of contract is a fundamental concept underlying the law of contracts).
The only way that NIR would not receive further payments from the development was if
there were no property remaining that could be sold in the future. At trial Richard Villelli
testified that based on his 47 years of real estate development, despite market fluctuations and
low points, as long as you "adapt, and as long as you're in a position that is relatively secure you
can adapt and make sure those projects move forward and are profitable." Tr Vol. 2, p. 364, L. 17; p. 357, L. 12-8; R Vol. VIII, p. 1721. By the time of trial the development of Trestle Creek
had generated approximately $73 million in revenue to POBD, leaving only approximately $7
million more until NIR could receive participation payments. Tr Vol. 2, p. 364, L. 19-23. The
trial court erred in holding that the vendor's lien was eliminated because there was no amount
currently due to NIR under the terms of the agreement.
Despite the clear language of LC. § 45-801 and the purchase price terms of the Purchase
and Sale Agreement, Union Bank argues that a default under the Purchase and Sale Agreement
was required for NIR to enforce or claim a vendor's lien. Respondent's Brief at 16. The statute
does not require that the buyer be in "default" as Union Bank contends to claim a vendor's lien.
All the statute requires is that there "remains unpaid and unsecured" a portion of the sale price.
LC. § 45-801. Unpaid participation payments and bulk sale payments satisfy that requirement.
The current imprecision of the value of NIR's lien does not invalidate the lien. For
instance, the participation payments owed to NIR are analogous to unliquidated contingent
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claims in bankruptcy, which are routinely handled by bankruptcy courts. A claim in bankruptcy
is broadly defined as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). An unliquidated claim is simply a claim
with an undetermined value. In re Teigen, 228 B.R. 720, 723 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1998); cited by In

re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d 826, 839 (9th Cir. 2009); Black's Law Dictionary 282 (Bryan A.
Gardner ed., 9th ed., West 2009). A contingent claim is defined as "one which the debtor will be
called upon to pay only upon the occurrence or happening of an extrinsic event which will
trigger the liability of the debtor to the alleged creditor." In re Ybarra, 424 F.3d 1018, 1023 (9th
Cir. 2005). Contingent claims are allowed in bankruptcy and the only real difficulty they present
is their valuation. See In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 2009). The bankruptcy
code's way of dealing with difficult valuation of unliquidated contingent claims is to estimate
their value. 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(l). Bankruptcy courts do not dismiss or disallow an unliquidated
contingent claim because the valuation is speculative or uncertain.
Just like an unliquidated contingent claim in bankruptcy, NIR's entitlement to
participation payments for sales of Trestle Creek is "a right to payment," with an undetermined
value, and "one which [POBD] will be called upon to pay only upon the occurrence or
happening of an extrinsic event which will trigger the liability of [POBD] to [NIR]." The
present value of NIR's vendor's lien is not an issue before this Court, and that was not an issue
before the district court.

The issue before the district court, and now before this Court, is

whether NIR has a vendor's lien, not the value of the lien.
Despite the difficulty in placing a number today on NIR's vendor's lien, it certainly has
value. Under the Purchase and Sale Agreement NIR is entitled to further payments for sales over
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$80 million, and in the event of a bulk sale. Trial Exhibit 3, p. 3-8. The anticipated amount of
participation payments ranged from $16 million to $20 million. Tr Vol. 2, p. 147, L. 4-16; p.
293, L. 1-8. That is hardly an amount of no value as concluded by the district court.
Union Bank also argues to this Court that California and Illinois law should control the
determination of whether NIR has a valid and enforceable vendor's lien on Idaho property.
Respondent's Brief at 17-18. Neither the law of California or Illinois is controlling on this Court
and can be disregarded by this Court. Curlee v. Kootenai Cty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,
396, 224 P.3d 458, 463 (2008). If a sister state has a statute similar to an Idaho statute the sister
state's interpretation of its statute may persuade this Court to interpret an Idaho statute a certain
way. Id. However, this persuasive effect is only applicable when the sister state is interpreting a
statute similar to Idaho's. Id. A sister state's common law regarding an area oflaw codified in
Idaho is not given the same persuasive character:
When confronted with matters of first impression involving Idaho statutes, this
Court may glean insight from the interpretations of sister states concerning
similar or identical statutes. See e.g. Corp. ofPresiding Bishop of Church of
Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410, 418, 849 P .2d
83, 91 (1993); Ada County Assessor v. Roman Catholic Diocese ofBoise, 123
Idaho 425,431,849 P.2d 98, 104 (1993). However, while the construction ofa
statute by another state may be persuasive, it is not conclusive and we may
refuse to adopt the foreign construction. Mochel v. Cleveland, 51 Idaho 468,
480, 5 P.2d 549,553 (1930).

Id (emphasis added).
The Illinois law cited by Union Bank should be disregarded by this Court because Illinois
strongly disfavors vendor's liens:
A vendor's lien, in general, is viewed with disfavor, having arisen in times
whose peculiar conditions and institutions were alien to our own. It is from its
nature secret and unknown to the world-often productive of harm. 29 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 737; 2 Warvelle on Vendors (2d Ed.) par. 679. This court
has therefore frequently held that the rights under such a lien ought not to be
enforced except where they are distinctly and clearly made out; that they should
not be extended beyond the requirements of the settled principles of equity.
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Ross v. Clark, 225 Ill. 326, 330-31, 80 N.E. 275, 275 (1907) (emphasis added). There is no
indication that Idaho courts or the legislature disfavors vendor's liens like Illinois does. To the
contrary, vendor's liens are statutory in Idaho and have a long positive case history in Idaho.
Thus, this Court should not consider Illinois's treatment of vendor's liens because it is contrary
to Idaho law.
Not only should the Illinois law cited by Union Bank be disregarded because of Illinois's
negative treatment of vendor's liens, but it and the California case law cited by Union Bank
should be disregarded by this Court because none of that law is based on a statutory vendor's
lien. Both the Gard and Cowan cases from California, and the Ross case from Illinois are based
on common law vendor's liens in those states. None of those cases relate to a statutory right to a
vendor's lien. This distinction is important because foreign law should only be considered by
this Court in aid of interpretation of an Idaho statute when that law is based on a similar statute.
Because none of those cases deals with a vendor's lien statute similar to Idaho's, they should be
disregarded by this Court.
If this Court is inclined to consider the California cases cited by Union Bank, it should

recognize that each of those cases is factually distinguishable from the case at hand.

For

instance, in the Cowan case, the California District Court of Appeal enunciated three
independent grounds of dismissal for the vendor's lien action before it discussed the contingency
of the claimed amount owing. Cowan v. Sec.-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. App. 2d
390, 393, 51 P.2d 440 (1935). Those independent grounds were as follows: 1) there was no sale
of real property as required for a vendor's lien claim, 2) the vendor's lien claim was barred by
the statute of limitations, and 3) the property settlement agreement upon which the plaintiff
based the vendor's lien claim had "plain wording" that "negatived the idea that the [plaintiff]
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was to have any lien upon the property enforceable upon the purchaser thereof." Id. Each of
these reasons was an independent basis for the court's dismissal of the action.

Despite

independent grounds for dismissal, the court further stated that the contingency related to the
obligation to pay was incompatible with vendor's lien theory in California. Id. The Cowan court
had not even made a determination of whether the proper relationship- existed between the -parties
to establish a vendor's lien when it recited law concerning contingencies: "Assuming, without
deciding, that the relationship of vendor and vendee existed between the parties by reason of the
agreement, the terms of said agreement were inconsistent with the theory of a vendor's lien." Id.
Since the court's language and pronouncement of law concerning the requirements of a vendor's
lien was not necessary to its decision (already dismissed on statute oflimitations grounds), those
statements are dictum and not controlling. State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 74, 305 P.3d 513,
518 (2013). The inconsistency does not exist in Idaho, or the present case.
The Gard case is also distinguishable from the case before this Court. In Gard the claim
for a vendor's lien was dismissed because the parties did not have an agreement that satisfied the
basic requirements of a vendor's lien:
I cannot see how it is possible to conclude that this agreement was, in effect, or in
the intention of the parties, an acknowledgment of an indebtedness for the
purchase price of the granted premises, and a promise to pay it.
Gard v. Gard, 108 Cal. 19, 24, 40 P. 1059 (1895). The court acting in equity did not find it

equitable to make a party pay something that it had never agreed to or promised to pay in the
first place. In stark contrast, the Purchase and Sale Agreement between NIR and POBD clearly
contained POBD's acknowledgement that it was promising to pay the purchase price for Trestle
Creek, including both the sums due immediately and those due upon the happening of future
contingencies. Thus, this case is distinguishable from the Gard case because it is clear that
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POBD and NIR intended POBD to be bound by the agreement to pay the full purchase price of
the land subject to the agreement.
In addition to the inapplicability of these foreign cases, there is also no need to look to

foreign law to interpret Idaho' vendor's lien statute.

Our statute does not require that the

purchase price creating the lien contain no contingencies regarding payment.

If the Idaho

legislature wanted the lien to be limited in such a manner, it would have written the statute that
way. For at least 100 years Idaho's vendor's lien statute has been worded the same way, giving
the legislature ample time to change the wording if it so chose. See Farnsworth v. Pepper, 27
Idaho 154, 148 P. 48, 50 (1915). There is no reason to interpret Idaho's vendor's lien statute to
only create a vendor's lien in circumstances where the purchase price carries no contingencies to
the vendor's payment. This Court looks to the plain language of the statute and gives those
words their plain and ordinary meaning. Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215,223,268 P.3d
1167, 1175 (2012). There is no need to add requirements to the statute that the legislature did
not include itself as urged by Union Bank.
Looking to the Idaho case law cited by Union Bank, the distinction Union Bank misses is
the difference between the existence of a vendor's lien and the requirements to foreclose on a
vendor's lien. It is undisputed that there is no current default by POBD for unpaid participation
or bulk sale payments. However, those payments are still an unpaid portion of the purchase price
owed to NIR. What Union Bank argues to this Court is that a vendor's lien is not created until
there is a default in payment to the vendor of the purchase price of the land. Respondent's Brief
at 19.

Union Bank confuses the conditions necessary to enforce a vendor's lien with the

conditions necessary to create a vendor's lien. Adopting Union Bank's argument would be
similar to concluding that a mortgagee/lender has no security on a home unless and until the
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mortgagor/borrower defaults on its loan payments. The security necessarily precedes the default,
even though default is required to enforce or foreclose on the mortgage.
Union Bank contends under Idaho law it is recognized there is an inseparable relationship
between a vendor's lien and the debt owed to the buyer. The Blankenship case cited by Union
Bank to support this argument merely held that an action to foreclose a vendor's lien runs "when
the statute oflimitations runs to bar the claim for the debt." Blankenship v. Myers, 97 Idaho 356,
371, 544 P.2d 314, 329 (1975). That proposition only relates to enforcement of the lien, which
cannot occur until there has been a default in payment. In the present case, POBD was not in
default with NIR on payments.
Regarding creation of the lien, the Blankenship court recited the conditions contained
within LC.§ 45-801:
The vendor's lien is a lien created by statute, LC. § 45-801, to protect the
unsecured seller of real property by giving him rights in the property sold, subject
to the rights of a good faith purchaser for value as provided in LC. s 45-803, when
he has no other collateral to secure payment for the property. This statutory lien
codified the common law rule which established a vendor's lien under similar
circumstances.

Id.
The creation of a vendor's lien is much less complicated than Union Bank would like this
Court to believe. A vendor's lien exists in favor of the seller of real property who has not yet
been paid the full purchase price for the property and is otherwise unsecured. NIR is entitled to
participation payments and bulk sale payments as part of the purchase price of Trestle Creek.
The Purchase and Sale Agreement clearly and unambiguously includes these future payments
within the purchase price for the sale. NIR has not yet received these payments. Therefore, a
vendor's lien has been created in favor of NIR, even though POBD has not yet defaulted in its
payments to NIR.
16

C.

PACIFIC CAPITAL WAS NOT A BONA FIDE LENDER

Union Bank argues to this Court that recordation of the First Partial Termination
Agreement in March 2007, instrument number 724831, released any vendor's lien on Trestle
Creek that NIR might have had. Respondent's Brief at 20. Union Bank further argues that this
release was an independent ground for the district court's dismissal ofNIR's vendor's lien claim.
Respondent's Brief at 20. Union Bank mischaracterizes the purpose, effect, and impact of the
partial termination and the subsequent recordation of the partial termination, as well as the
holding of the district court.
First, the district court never held that the partial termination alone was enough to
extinguish a vendor's lien under Idaho law. Instead, the district court held that "NIR's lien is
inferior to UB's lien because of the Partial Termination Agreement." R Vol. VIII, p. 1721. The
district court also concluded that because of the recorded partial termination "UB was entitled to
rely upon the recorded title to Trestle Creek as it existed in 2008 when UB made its loan to
POBD." R Vol. VIII, p. 1721.

Further, the district court explained that this finding was

conclusive because "[t]here is no evidence that UB had notice of any mistakes in the recorded
record of title to Trestle Creek when UB made its loan and/or security agreement with POBD.
R. Vol. VIII, p. 1721-1722. In other words, the district court found there was constructive notice
indicating an elimination of the vendor's lien at the time the loan was made, and Pacific Capital
had no actual knowledge of the vendor's lien.

Therefore, Pacific Capital was a bona fide

encumbrancer when it made its loan.
Contrary to Union Bank's claim, the district court made no factual finding or legal
determination that a recorded document with a mistakenly attached exhibit of property released
Trestle Creek from the vendor's lien. While the first sentence of the second last paragraph of
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record page 1721 says "The partial termination agreement recorded March 17, 2007 (NIR exhibit
EEE) releases the Trestle Creek property from NIR's vendor's lien," that sentence should not be
read in isolation. Reading that sentence with the preceding paragraph and following paragraphs
makes it clear that the district court made a determination on Union Bank's status as a bona fide
encumbrancer for value. The district court did not conclude that the recording of a partial
termination in and of itself extinguished a lien despite the actual knowledge of a party to the
contrary.
The testimony and evidence at trial was clear and undisputed that the reason the first
Partial Termination Agreement was recorded was to release lots which members of POBD had
purchased prior to the purchase and sale agreement with MDG. 3 Tr Vol. 2, p. 296, L. 3 -p. 297,
L. 18.

Charles Reeves maintained the inclusion of these previously owned lots in the

memorandum of contract was inequitable because they were sold before negotiation of the
purchase and sale agreement. Id. NIR agreed and executed the partial release. Tr Vol. 2, p. 297,
L. 7-14. When Villelli, as the representative of NIR's managing member, executed the partial
termination, it contained one Exhibit A with a four-line legal description of seven lots lying
within the Golden T and Golden T Estates First Addition subdivisions. Tr Vol. 2, p. 297, L. 19 p. 298, L. 3; Trial Exhibit 4.
Contemporaneously with the execution of the partial termination, NIR executed a
subordination agreement at the request of POBD, subordinating its vendor's lien to R.E. Loans'
mortgage. Tr Vol. 2, p. 291, L. 19 - p. 292, L. 22. That subordination agreement was recorded
as instrument number 724832 the same day the partial termination was recorded and was
recorded immediately behind the partial termination. When the partial termination was recorded
it erroneously included a second "Exhibit A," which matched the legal description included with
3

As explained in Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, MDG was a predecessor in interest to POBD.
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the subordination agreement.

Exhibit EEE; Tr Vol. 2, p. 298, LL 4-16.

No one had an

explanation at trial on how this recording error occurred, but it was clear from the evidence and
testimony presented at trial that the partial termination was never meant to release Trestle Creek
from NIR's vendor's lien.
On March 1L- 2009, the .....partial termination was re-recorded by... Sandpoint
Title with only
.....
..
the original Exhibit A (the one with the four-line property description of seven lots that were part
of the Golden T and Golden T Estates First Addition subdivision as originally executed by
Villelli.) Trial Exhibit 5. The reason reflected on the face of the document for its re-recording
was to correct the legal description of the partial termination. Trial Exhibit 5.
Despite the clear evidence presented at trial that the partial termination was never
intended to release NIR's vendor's lien in Trestle Creek, Union Bank argues by the recording of
the document alone eliminated any claim of NIR had to a vendor's lien. This was not the
conclusion of the trial court, nor is it the correct legal conclusion.
The "partial release" was recorded on March 15, 2007. Pacific Capital prepared its credit
authorization report October 29, 2007, after the partial release was recorded. Trial Exhibit III.
On March 11, 2009, the partial termination was re-recorded to correct the erroneous legal
description attached to the first partial termination.
The March 11, 2009, re-recording of the partial termination to correct the legal
description caused the re-recorded partial termination to relate back to the original recording date
under the equitable relation back doctrine:
The doctrine of relation back permits a party to a conveyance of real property to
correct an erroneous legal description in the original deed by filing a subsequent
or "correction" deed; the correction then becomes effective as of the date of the
original deed.
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Sartain v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 116 Idaho 269,272, 775 P.2d 161, 164 (Ct. App. 1989); see also
Barnhardt v. Hansen, 36 Idaho 419, 211 P. 438, 439 (1922) (where a deed is drawn with the
intent to carry out a prior agreement to convey property, but by mistake of the scrivener does not
fulfill such intention, equity will correct such error by reforming the instrument to conform to the
intention of the parties).
The trial testimony was clear that the original partial termination was never intended to
include the Trestle Creek property. Tr Vol. 2, p. 296, L. 3 - p. 297, L. 18.; p. 297, L. 7-14.; p.
297, L. 19 - p. 298, L. 3; Trial Exhibit 4. Therefore, the 2009 re-recording of the partial
termination corrected the erroneous legal description of the original partial termination as if it
never happened. The relation back doctrine has some protections for intervening third parties4,
which was Union Bank's position at trial.
Even the recording law cited by Union Bank supports the conclusion that the recorded
partial termination does not release Trestle Creek from the vendor's lien.

The purpose of

recording conveyances of real property in Idaho is to "to give notice to others that an interest is
claimed in real property, and thus give protection against bona fide third parties who may be
dealing in the same property." Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758, 761, 572 P.2d 861, 864
(1977). However, mere recordation of an instrument does not give the instrument legal effect
when it is otherwise deficient or contains mistakes, it simply provides constructive notice of the
instrument. For instance, a recorded instrument that is not acknowledged as required by LC. §
55-805 "imparts no constructive notice to anyone." Harris v. Reed, 21 Idaho 364, 121 P. 780,
780 (1912); Matter of New Concept Realty & Dev., Inc., 753 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1985);

"As a predicate to operation of this doctrine, the parties executing a correction deed must do so in the absence of
fraud, and where a third party has not intervened." Sartain v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 116 Idaho 269,272, 775 P.2d
161, 164 (Ct. App. 1989).

4
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Credit Bureau of Preston v. Sleight, 92 Idaho 210, 215, 440 P.2d 143, 148 (1968). Similarly, a

mortgage recorded by a stranger in title does not provide constructive knowledge of the
instrument, even if it is recorded. Jackson v. Lee, 47 Idaho 589, 277 P. 548, 549 (1929). These
principles taken together support the assertion that at best, recording only provides constructive
notice to third parties when the instrument meets the requirements for recording. Recording
cannot make an unintentional partial termination a full and complete release merely because the
document was recorded. Accordingly, recording the partial termination had no effect on NIR's
claim to a vendor's lien and NIR's lien survived the first recording of the partial termination
because of the relation back doctrine.

It merely goes to the weight of whether there was

constructive notice of the lien that should have put Pacific Capital on notice of the lien.
Union Bank may rest on the constructive notice as it stood when Pacific Capital made its
loan.

That constructive notice was a "partial release" with two Exhibit A's, one of which

encompassed the entire property. On appeal, NIR did not challenge that Union Bank might be a
bona fide encumbrancer based upon the constructive notice it had. Instead, it challenged its
status as a bona fide purchaser based upon its actual knowledge.
Union Bank was not a bona fide encumbrancer of Trestle Creek because it had actual
knowledge of NIR's vendor's lien when it made its loan to POBD and subsequently accepted
Trestle Creek as collateral on Facility #2. The district court erred when it held that Pacific
Capital did not have actual knowledge ofNIR's vendor's lien.
As noted in the opening brief on appeal, Idaho statute places a vendor's lien at the highest
priority possible, except as to good faith encumbrancers for value. LC. § 45-803. Good faith in
that section means "lack of actual Q.! constructive knowledge of the applicable lien." Benz v. D.L.
Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215,228,268 P.3d 1167, 1180 (2012) (emphasis added). Any knowledge
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of another's claim in real property, whether actual or constructive, negates good faith. Fouser v.

Paige, 101 Idaho 294, 298, 612 P.2d 137, 141 (1980). Good faith can be negated by both actual
knowledge or constructive knowledge. The district court erred in holding that Pacific Capital
had no actual knowledge that the constructive notice of the partial termination was incorrect.
Pacific Capital had actual knowledge that NIR was still owed part of the purchase price
for Trestle Creek even after the first partial termination was recorded as evidenced by Pacific
Capital's own credit authorization memorandum.

Trial Exhibit III, Pacific Capital's credit

authorization report, showed that Pacific Capital had actual knowledge of NIR's claim to a
vendor's lien. The "Summary Purpose" section of the report indicated that NIR was still owed
money from the sale, independent of participation payments or bulk sale payments. Trial Exhibit
III, p. 1. The same amount owing NIR was also referenced in the Sources and Uses section of
the credit authorization report. Trial Exhibit III, p. 3. The Sales History section referenced the
Purchase and Sale Agreement and NIR' s entitlement to participation payments. Trial Exhibit III,
p. 10. Terrilyn Baron, vice president of Union Bank at the time of trial, testified that based on
her review of Exhibit III, Pacific Capital knew about the purchase and sale agreement terms and
POBD's obligation to make participation payments to NIR. Tr Vol. 2, p. 256, L. 5-17. Pacific
Capital had reviewed POBD's Operating Agreement (Trial Exhibit MMM) that referenced
POBD's obligation to pay NIR a down payment and participation payments. Tr Vol. 2, p. 257,
L. 6 - p. 258, L. 18. The liabilities portion of the credit authorization report indicated that notes
payable in the Pend Oreille (Trestle Creek) project were 9.100M from RE Loans Inc. and
3.070M in seller carry and assumed financing. Trial Exhibit III, p. 33. All of this taken together
was sufficient evidence to establish that Pacific Capital had actual knowledge after the partial
termination was recorded that NIR was still owed money from the real property sale. This actual
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knowledge precluded a finding by the trial court that Pacific Capital had no constructive notice
that the partial release might be in error. 5
The district court erred in finding "[t]here is no evidence that UB had notice of any
mistakes in the recorded record of title to Trestle Creek when UB made its loan and/or security
agreement with POBD." R p. 1721-1722. The district court was presented with competent and
substantial evidence of actual knowledge of NIR' s vendor's lien. Union Bank was not a bona
fide lender when it accepted Trestle Creek as collateral and its mortgage should not have priority
over NIR's vendor's lien.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and those set forth m NIR's Opening Brief, NIR
respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's ruling that NIR's vendor's lien was
paid in full. NIR further asks this Court reverse the district court's ruling that Union Bank was a
bona fide lender because it had no knowledge ofNIR's vendor's lien.
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of January, 2016.
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

SUSAN P. WEEKS
Attorneys for Appellant North Idaho Resorts, LLC

5 At trial, it appeared based on the loan file that Pacific Capital was unaware of the partial tennination because it was
not included in the title report, and was not in the loan file. Thus, the only issue is what constructive notice Pacific
Capital would have had ifit was aware of the partial tennination.
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